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From 1949 to 1978, China’s communist regime prohibited private enterprise and largely sealed
the country off from international trade. But then in 1978, Chinese policy took a surprising turn.
Declaring that “to grow rich is glorious”, the communist party opened the doors to internal private
enterprise and then later to external trade. Because China is such a large country (20 percent of the
world population), it’s decision to join the world trading system is a topic of considerable public
policyinterest. TheconcernsthatpeoplehaveareclearlyexpressedinanarticlefromTheEconomist
magazine (February 15-21, 2003):
“BusinessesallovertheworldhaveseenChinagobbleupthetoyindustry, andtheynow
lookoninhorrorasitdoesthesameforshoes, fridges, microwavesandairconditioners.
This country of 1.3 billion people has an apparently inexhaustible supply of workers,
willing to work long hours for pitifully low pay...How can anybody compete against
this gigantic new workshop of the world?”
In the same article though, potential beneﬁts of China’s entry into the world trading system are also
expressed:
“The focus, though, should not be on such obstacles, but on the great beneﬁts of China’s
growth. Millions of consumers in other countries are gaining from the low prices and
high quality of Chinese goods. A billion Chinese are escaping the dire poverty of the
past. Businesses across the globe will proﬁt from supplying a vast new market.”
This paper presents a conceptual framework for thinking about these issues: a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model of North-South trade and economic growth. In the model, both innovation
and imitation rates are endogenously determined as well as the degree of wage inequality between
Northern and Southern workers. Northern ﬁrms devote resources to innovative R&D to discover
higher quality products and Southern ﬁrms devote resources to imitative R&D to copy state-of-the-
art quality Northern products. In each industry, new products are initially produced in the North
by Northern quality leaders but then when copying occurs, production shifts to the South. Along
the model’s equilibrium path, Southern (developing) countries like China are “gobbling up” mi-
crowaves, fridges, air conditioners, etc., products that used to be produced in Northern (developed)
countries. The model also captures the potential beneﬁts of China’s entry into the world trading sys-
tem. The proﬁt ﬂows earned by Northern quality leaders increase when these ﬁrms are able to sell
1to a larger Southern market of consumers and Northern consumers beneﬁt from copying because
product prices drop when production shifts from the “high wage” North to the “low wage” South.1
Many models of North-South trade and economic growth have already been developed, includ-
ing Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b), Lai (1998), Yang
and Maskus (2001), and Glass and Saggi (2002).2 So the question naturally arises: why do we need
another model of North-South trade and economic growth? For thinking about issues like China’s
entry into the world trading system, why not just use a model that has already been developed? Our
decision to develop a new analytical framework is based on the following two considerations.
First, all of the above-mentioned North-South trade models have clearly counterfactual impli-
cations for economic growth. For example, these model all imply that any increase in the size of
the South permanently increases the economic growth rate in the North. Since 1950, the South
has increased dramatically in size, both due to population growth and to developing countries like
China opening up to international trade. But as Jones (1995a) has pointed out, there has not been
any upward trend in the economic growth rates of advanced countries since 1950. Furthermore, the
counterfactual growth implications of these models are clearly linked to assumptions about R&D.
All of these models imply that the Northern economic growth rate is proportional to the Northern
R&D employment level. If Northern R&D employment doubles, the Northern economic growth
rate should also double. Since 1950, R&D employment has more than doubled in the US and other
advanced countries without generating any upward trend in economic growth rates.
Second, all of the above-mentioned papers focus on the steady-state equilibrium properties of
North-South trade models and do not study the welfare implications. But as The Economist quo-
tations illustrate, people are interested not only in knowing about the equilibrium implications of
changes in the economic environment, they are also interested in knowing about the welfare impli-
cations. For example, do people beneﬁt from China’s decision to join the world trading system? Do
people beneﬁt when trade costs between the North and the South fall?
In this paper, we present a model of North-South trade that avoids both of these drawbacks. To
rule out the counterfactual growth implications of earlier North-South trade models, we assume that
1The terminology West-East may be more appropriate that North-South since China is located in the East. Neverthe-
less, we stick with the usual North-South terminology for describing trade between developed and developing countries.
Furthermore, by the South we do not mean all developing countries. Most technological imitation is done by newly
industrialized countries while the majority of developing countries engage in this activity only marginally (see Helpman,
1993).
2Forasurvey of the literature on North-South trade and economic growth, see Chui, Levine, Murshed and Pearlman
(2002).
2innovating becomes more difﬁcult as products improve in quality and become more complex. This
assumption was ﬁrst employed by Li (2003) to study economic growth in a closed-economy setting
buth as not been used before to study North-South trade.3 The model is suitable for analyzing both
the equilibrium and welfare implications of changes in the economic environment. To illustrate the
model’s potential, we explore the implications of three aspects of “globalization”: increases in the
size of the South (i.e., countries like China joining the world trading system), stronger intellectual
property protection (i.e., the TRIPs agreement that was part of the Uruguay Round), and lower trade
costs.
Focusing on trade costs ﬁrst, we show that a decrease in trade costs between the North and the
South has no effect on either the rate of copying of Northern products or the Northern innovation
rate. When trade costs fall, Northern ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts from exporting to the South but their
proﬁts fall from selling their products in the North because the Northern market becomes more
competitive. Overall proﬁts do not change, so lower trade costs do not affect the incentives to either
innovate or imitate. However they do lead to a reallocation of resources within both regions since
ﬁrms respond by producing less for the domestic market and exporting more. For ﬁrms in the larger
Northern market, the ﬁrst consideration is more important for labor demand and lower trade costs
lead to a permanent decrease in the relative wage of Northern workers. Thus lower trade costs
contribute to reducing North-South income inequality.
Turning to the welfare implications, we show that lower trade costs unambiguously beneﬁt con-
sumers in both regions. Even though the relative wage of Northern workers falls, this effect of lower
trade costs is more than offset by the fact that consumers face lower prices for both domestically
produced and imported products.
When it comes to an increase in the size of the South, we show that this leads to a permanent
increase in the rate of copying of Northern products and a temporary increase in the Northern inno-
vation rate. When there are more Southern workers, the faster rate of technology transfer that results
means that more production jobs move from the high-wage North to the low-wage South. There is
ar eallocation of resources within the North away from production employment and towards R&D
employment. The increase in the size of the South also leads to a permanent decrease in the relative
wage of Northern workers. Interestingly, both lower trade costs and increases in the size of the
South are associated with decreasing North-South income inequality, consistent with the evidence
3Other closed-economy R&D-driven endogenous growth models that do not have the counterfactual “scale effect”
property include Jones (1995b), Kortum (1997), Young (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Segerstrom (1998),
and Howitt (1999). For a survey of this literature, see Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999).
3reported in Jones (1997) and Sala-i-Martin (2002).
When it comes to the welfare implications of an increase in the size of the South, things are
more complicated (than for lower trade costs) because both rates of innovation and imitation are
affected. Northern consumers are hurt by the fall in their wage and interest income but on the other
hand, they beneﬁt from being able to buy higher quality products at lower prices. The overall effect
on Northern consumer welfare of an increase in the size of the South is ambiguous. In contrast
with the author of The Economist quotes, who concluded that the beneﬁts for advanced countries
of China joining the world trading system exceed the costs, we ﬁnd no presumption that Northern
consumers beneﬁt in the long run from a larger South. We do ﬁnd though that Southern consumers
unambiguously beneﬁt. Due to an increase in the size of the South, Southern consumers are able to
buyh igher quality products at lower prices and they also beneﬁt from the increase in the Southern
relative wage.
Finally, in comparison with an increase in the size of the South, stronger intellectual prop-
erty protection has the exact opposite steady-state equilibrium and long-run welfare implications.
Stronger intellectual property protection leads to a permanent decrease in the rate of copying of
Northern products and a temporary decrease in the Northern innovation rate. Fewer production jobs
move to the South and there is a reallocation of resources within the North away from R&D em-
ployment. Stronger intellectual property protection also leads to a permanent increase in the relative
wage of Northern workers. Northern consumers beneﬁt from the increase in their wage and interest
income but on the other hand, they are hurt by the slower rate of technological change, leaving the
overall effect on the welfare of Northern consumers ambiguous. We do ﬁnd though that Southern
consumers are unambiguously made worse off by stronger intellectual property protection. They
are hurt both by the slower rate of technological change and the decrease in the Southern relative
wage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the dynamic general equilibrium
model of North-South trade and economic growth is presented. Section 3 studies the steady-state
equilibrium properties of the model and Section 4 studies the corresponding welfare implications.
Section 5 concludes.
42T h e M o d e l
2.1 Overview
We consider a model where there is trade between two regions: North and South. The North and
the South are distinguished by their R&D capabilities. Workers in the North are capable of conduct-
ing both innovative and imitative R&D whereas workers in the South can only conduct imitative
R&D. We focus on the steady-state equilibrium properties of the model where all innovative activ-
ity takes place in the high-wage North and all imitative activity takes place in the low-wage South.
Innovation takes the form of improvements in the quality of products and imitation takes the form
of copying state-of-the-art quality products. In each industry where production is currently in the
South, production shifts to the North when a Northern ﬁrm innovates and in each industry where
production is currently in the North, production shifts to the South when a Southern ﬁrm imitates.
Both innovation and imitation rates are endogenously determined as well as the degree of wage
inequality between Northern and Southern workers.
The model builds on an earlier model of North-South trade by Grossman and Helpman (1991a)
butd iffers in several important respects. First, to avoid the counterfactual growth implications of the
earlier literature, we assume that innovating becomes more difﬁcult as products improve in quality,
building on Li (2003). Second, we assume that consumer preferences are CES (instead of Cobb-
Douglas). Third, we assume that the rate of population growth is positive (instead of zero). Finally,
we allow for positive trade costs between the North and the South.
2.2 Industry Structure
There is a continuum of industries indexed by θ ∈ [0,1].I neach industry θ,ﬁ rms are distinguished
by the quality of the products they produce. Higher values of the index j denote higher quality
products and j is restricted to taking on integer values. At time t =0 ,t he state-of-the-art quality
product in each industry is j =0 ,t hat is, some ﬁrm in each industry knows how to produce a
j =0quality product and no ﬁrm knows how to produce any higher-quality product. To learn how
to produce higher-quality products, Northern ﬁrms in each industry participate in innovative R&D
races. In general, when the state-of-the-art quality product in an industry is j,t h enext winner of
an innovative R&D race becomes the sole producer of a j +1quality product. Thus, over time,
products improve as innovations push each industry up its “quality ladder.”
52.3 Workers and Consumers
In both the North and the South, there is a ﬁxed measure of households that provide labor services in
exchange for wage payments. Each individual member of a household lives forever and is endowed
with one unit of labor, which is inelastically supplied. The size of each household, measured by
the number of its members, grows exponentially at a ﬁxed rate n>0,t he population growth
rate. Normalizing the initial size of each household to unity, the number of household members at
time t is given by ent.L e tLN(t)=¯ LNent denote the supply of labor in the North at time t,l e t
LS(t)=¯ LSent denote the supply of labor in the South at time t and let L(t)=LN(t)+LS(t)
denote the supply of labor in the North and South combined at time t.
Households in both the North and the South share identical preferences. Each household is


























is the utility per person at time t.E quation (2) is a quality-augmented CES consumption index;
d(j,θ,t) denotes the quantity demanded (or consumed) per person of a j quality product produced
in industry θ at time t,p arameter σ>1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between products
across industries, and δ>1 is an innovation size parameter. Because δj is increasing in j, (2)
captures in a simple way the idea that consumers prefer higher quality products.
Fore ach household, the discounted utility maximization problem can be solved in three steps.









where θ and t are ﬁxed, p(j,θ,t) is the price of the j quality product produced in industry θ at
time t,a n dc(θ,t) is the individual consumer’s expenditure in industry θ at time t.T h es o l u tion to
this problem is to only buy the product with the lowest quality-adjusted price pj(θ)/δj.W h e nt w o
products have the same quality-adjusted price so consumers are indifferent, we restrict attention to
equilibria where consumers only buy the higher quality product.












where t is ﬁxed, d(θ,t) is the individual’s quantity demanded of the product with the lowest quality-
adjusted price in industry θ at time t, j(θ,t) is the quality index of the product with the lowest
quality-adjusted price in industry θ at time t, p(θ,t) is the price of this product, and c(t) is the con-







for the product in industry θ at time t with the lowest quality adjusted price, where q(θ,t)=
δ(σ−1)j(θ,t) is an alternative measure of product quality. The quantity demanded for all other prod-
ucts is zero.
The third step is to solve the dynamic optimization problem by maximizing discounted utility
(1) given (2), (3), and the intertemporal budget constraint ˙ A(t)=w(t)+r(t)A(t) − c(t) − nA(t),
where A(t) is the individual’s assets at time t, w(t) is the individual’s wage rate at time t,a n dr(t) is




= r(t) − ρ. (4)
Individual consumer expenditure c grows over time if and only if the market interest rate r exceeds
the subjective discount rate ρ.
Let wN and wS denote the equilibrium wage rates in the North and South, respectively. Like-
wise, let cN and cS denote the representative consumer’s expenditure in the North and South, re-
spectively. We solve the model for a steady-state equilibrium where wN, wS, cN and cS are all
constant over time. Then (4) implies that the steady-state market interest rate is also constant over
time and given by r(t)=ρ.
2.4 Product Markets
In each industry, ﬁrms compete in prices and maximize proﬁts. Labor is the only factor of produc-
tion and manufacturing of output is characterized by constant returns to scale. Labor markets are
perfectly competitive in both regions. For each ﬁrm that knows how to produce a product, one unit
of labor produces one unit of output independently of its quality level or location of production.
7Thus, each ﬁrm in the North has a constant marginal cost equal to wN and each ﬁrm in the South
has a constant marginal cost equal to wS.T here are also trade costs separating the two regions that
take the “iceberg” form: τ ≥ 1 units of a good must be produced and exported in order to have one
unit arriving at destination. This applies to goods produced in both the North and the South.4
Taking into account the trade costs, production only completely shifts from the North to the
South when a Southern ﬁrm imitates if wN >τ w S.L ikewise, production only completely shifts
from the South to the North when a Northern ﬁrm innovates if τwN <δ w S.W es o l v ethe model
for a steady-state equilibrium where both inequalities hold, that is, the Northern relative wage w ≡
wN/wS satisﬁes τ<w<δ / τ .
At each point in time, a ﬁrm can choose to shut down its manufacturing facilities and once it
has done so, this decision can only be reversed by incurring a positive entry cost. Furthermore,
each ﬁrm that fails to attract any consumers (has zero sales) incurs a positive cost of maintaining its
unused manufacturing facilities, in addition to the constant marginal cost of production mentioned
above. Thus ﬁrms that are not able to attract any consumers (because of the low relative quality of
their products) choose to shut down their manufacturing facilities in equilibrium and do not play any
role in determining market prices, as in Segerstrom (2005). If production is currently in the South
and a Northern ﬁrm innovates, the Southern ﬁrm immediately shuts down. Likewise, if production
is currently in the North and a Southern ﬁrm imitates, the Northern ﬁrm immediately shuts down.
In the presence of trade costs, Northern consumers face different prices than Southern con-
sumers and we need to take this into account. Using (3), the Northern consumer’s demand for a












where a star denotes exports and subscripts denote production location. In equations (5) and (6),






mN is the set of industries with Northern production, mS is the set of industries with Southern
4Anderson and Wincoop (2004) report that the international component of trade barriers including transport costs
and border barriers but not local distribution costs is estimated in the range of 40-80 percent of the ﬁnal price paid by
consumers in industrialized countries. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) focus on trade costs as the common cause of several
“puzzles” in international macroeconomics.


















Consider now the proﬁt-maximization decision of a Northern quality leader in industry θ at time





The ﬁrm supplies d∗
NLS units to Southern consumers but has to produce τd∗
NLS units and pay
its workers the Northern wage rate wN for each unit produced. Maximizing π∗
N with respect to p∗
N
yields the proﬁt-maximizing export price p∗
N = στ
σ−1wN, which is the standard monopoly markup of
price over marginal cost. Domestic proﬁts are given by πd
N = pNdNLN − wNdNLN. Maximizing
πN with respect to pd
N yields the proﬁt-maximizing domestic price pN = σ
σ−1wN. Taking into
account both domestic and export proﬁts, the total proﬁt ﬂow πN = πd
N +π∗



















SLN. The ﬁrm supplies d∗
SLN units to Northern
consumers but has to produce τd∗
SLN units and pays its workers the Southern wage rate wS for
each unit produced. Maximizing π∗
S with respect to p∗
S yields the proﬁt-maximizing export price
p∗
S = στ
σ−1wS. Domestic proﬁts are given by πd
S = pSdSLS − wSdSLS. Maximizing πd
S with
respect to pS yields the proﬁt-maximizing domestic price pS = σ
σ−1wS. Taking into account both
domestic and export proﬁts, the total proﬁt ﬂow πS = πd
S + π∗













Equations (9) and (10) have similar properties. In both the North and the South, proﬁts are
increasing in product quality q(θ,t),N orthern consumer expenditure cNLN(t) and Southern con-
sumer expenditure cSLS(t).S i n ce τ1−σ decreases as τ increases, higher trade costs cut into the
proﬁts that ﬁrms earn from exporting. For Northern ﬁrms, higher trade costs cut into the proﬁts that
they earn from selling to Southern consumers and for Southern ﬁrms, higher trade costs cut into the
proﬁts that they earn from selling to Northern consumers.
92.5 Innovation and Imitation
Labor is the only factor of production used by ﬁrms that engage in either innovative or imitative
R&D activities. When a Northern ﬁrm i in industry θ at time t hires  i workers to do innova-
tive R&D, this ﬁrm is successful in discovering the next higher-quality product with instantaneous





where γ>0 is a Northern R&D productivity parameter. As in Li (2003), the presence of the term
q(θ,t) in (11) captures the idea that as products improve in quality and become more complex,
innovating becomes more difﬁcult.5
Firms in the South can do imitative R&D to copy products developed in the North. When a
Southern ﬁrm i in industry θ at time t hires  i workers to do imitative R&D, this ﬁrm is successful
in discovering how to produce the state-of-the-art quality product in industry θ with instantaneous





where β>0 is a Southern R&D productivity parameter. A higher value β can be interpreted as
stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights. The presence of the term q(θ,t) in (12) captures
the idea that as products improve in quality and become more complex, imitating also becomes
more difﬁcult.6
The returns to both innovative and imitative R&D are assumed to be independently distributed
acrossﬁrms, industries, andovertime. Consequently, theinstantaneousprobabilitythatsomeNorth-
ern ﬁrm innovates in an industry is given by I =
 
i Ii and the instantaneous probability that some
Southern ﬁrm imitates in an industry is given by C =
 
i Ci.
The equilibrium pattern of innovation and imitation is illustrated in Figure 1. Northern ﬁrms
do innovative R&D in all industries and Southern ﬁrms do imitative R&D in the measure mN of
industries where production is currently in the North. No imitative R&D occurs in the measure mS
of industries where production is currently in the South because it is not proﬁtable to imitate in these
5Evidence that innovating is becoming more difﬁcult is provided by data on patenting. Kortum (1993, 1997) docu-
ments a decreasing patent-per-researcher ratio in a large set of countries. Looking at industry data, Kortum (1993) ﬁnds
that the patenting per unit of real R&D ratio has declined in all 20 industries for which data could be obtained. Also, Jones
(2005) ﬁnds evidence of an increasing knowledge burden over time that leads researchers to choose narrower expertise
and to compensate for their reduced individual capacities by working in larger teams.
6Mansﬁeld, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) have found that imitation costs are substantial, of the order of 65 percent
of innovation costs. They also found that patents rarely hinder imitation but typically make it more expensive, which is
consistent with our interpretation of β.
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Northern Quality






       Leaders
Figure 1: The pattern of innovation and imitation
industries. If a Southern ﬁrm were successful in copying a product produced by a Southern quality
leader, Bertrand price competition would drive proﬁts of both ﬁrms down to zero.7
We solve the model for a steady-state equilibrium where the innovation and imitation rate (I
and C)d onot vary across industries or over time. Since mN is constant over time in a steady-state
equilibrium, the ﬂow into the mN-industry state must equal the ﬂow out of the mN-industry state,








The measure of industries with Northern quality leaders mN is an increasing function of the rate
of innovation I and a decreasing function of the rate of imitation C.T h ec o n v erse is true for the
measure of industries with Southern quality leaders mS.
2.6 R&D Optimization
We assume that all ﬁrms maximize expected discounted proﬁts and that there is free entry into in-
novative R&D races in the North. Since all Northern ﬁrms have access to the same linear innovative
R&D technology (11), Northern quality leaders (the incumbents) do not engage in R&D activities.
Instead all innovative R&D in the North is done by other ﬁrms (the challengers) and the identity
of the quality leader in an industry changes every time innovation occurs. Northern quality leaders
have less to gain by innovating since they are already earning monopoly proﬁts and with challengers
entering innovative R&D races until their expected discounted proﬁts equal zero, it is not proﬁtable
for Northern quality leaders to do any innovative R&D.8
7We let mN denoteboththemeasureofindustrieswithNorthernqualityleadersandthesetofindustrieswithNorthern
quality leaders. Likewise, we let mS denote both the measure of industries with Southern quality leaders and the set of
industries with Southern quality leaders.
8The property that only industry followers engage in innovative R&D is a common property of R&D-driven endoge-
nous growth models. One can avoid this outcome and obtain that industry leaders invest in innovative R&D by assuming
11Consider now the incentives that a Northern challenger ﬁrm i has to engage in innovative R&D
in industry θ at time t.T he expected beneﬁt from engaging in innovative R&D is vI(θ,t)Iidt,w h e re
vI(θ,t) is the expected discounted proﬁts or reward for innovating and Iidt is ﬁrm i’s probability
of innovating during the inﬁnitesimal time interval dt.T he expected cost of engaging in innovative
R&D is equal to wN idt,w h e re  i is ﬁrm i’s innovative R&D employment. Equation (11) implies
that the expected cost can be rewritten as wNIiγq(θ,t)dt.T hus, since expected beneﬁt equals
expected cost in a steady-state equilibrium with free entry into innovative R&D races, it follows
that
vI(θ,t)=wNγq(θ,t) (14)
As the quality of products increases over time, innovating becomes more difﬁcult and the reward
for innovating must correspondingly increase to induce innovative effort by Northern ﬁrms.
We assume that there is also free entry into all imitative R&D races in the South. Consider the
incentives that a Southern ﬁrm i has to engage in imitative R&D in industry θ at time t (where there
is a Northern quality leader). The expected beneﬁt from engaging in imitative R&D is vC(θ,t)Cidt,
where vC(θ,t) is the expected discounted proﬁts or reward for imitating and Cidt is ﬁrm i’s prob-
ability of imitating during the inﬁnitesimal time interval dt.T he expected cost of engaging in
imitative R&D is equal to wS idt,w h e re  i is ﬁrm i’s imitative R&D employment. Equation (12)
implies that the expected cost can be rewritten as wSCiβq(θ,t)dt.T hus, since expected beneﬁt
equals expected cost in a steady-state equilibrium with free entry into imitative R&D races, it fol-
lows that
vC(θ,t)=wSβq(θ,t). (15)
As the quality of products increases over time, copying also becomes more difﬁcult and the reward
for copying must correspondingly increase to induce imitative effort by Southern ﬁrms.
We assumethatthere isastockmarketthatchannelsconsumersavingstoNorthernandSouthern
ﬁrmsthatengageinR&Dandhelpshouseholdstodiversifytheriskofholdingstocksissuedbythese
ﬁrms. We can calculate directly the rewards for innovating and imitating by solving for the stock
market values of Northern and Southern quality leaders.
Since there is a continuum of industries and the returns to engaging in R&D races are inde-
pendently distributed across ﬁrms and industries, each investor can completely diversify away risk
by holding a diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks. Thus, the return from holding the stock of a Northern
that industry leaders have some R&D cost advantages, as in Aghion et al (2001) and Segerstrom (2005).
12quality leader must be the same as the return from an equal-sized investment in a riskless bond and






− I − C = ρ.
This equation states that the dividend rate from the stock of a Northern quality leader πN
vI plus
the capital gains rate ˙ vI
vI minus the instantaneous probabilities of experiencing total capital losses
due to further innovation I and imitation C equals the market interest rate ρ.S ince the quality level
q(θ,t) is constant during an innovative R&D race and only jumps up when the race ends (innovation
occurs), it follows that vI(θ,t) is constant during an innovative R&D race and ˙ vI
vI =0 .T hus, for
the steady-state equilibrium reward for innovating is
vI(θ,t)=
πN(θ,t)
ρ + I + C
. (16)
The proﬁts earned by each Northern quality leaderπN are appropriately discounted using the market
interest rate ρ,t he instantaneous probability I of being driven out of business by Northern ﬁrms
which develop higher quality products and the instantaneous probability C of being driven out of
business by Southern ﬁrms which copy the Northern ﬁrm’s product (and have lower wage costs).
The stock market value of a Southern quality leader can be similarly calculated. The corre-






− I = ρ.





The proﬁts earned by each Southern quality leader πS are appropriately discounted using the market
interest rate ρ and the instantaneous probability I of being driven out of business by Northern ﬁrms
which develop higher quality products. A Southern quality leader does not have to worry about its
product being copied by another Southern ﬁrm since there is no reward for copying already copied
products (if copying resulted in two Southern quality leaders in an industry, then under Bertrand
price competition, the market price would fall down to marginal cost and both proﬁts and the reward
for copying would equal zero).
Let Q(t) ≡
  1
0 q(θ,t)dθ denote the average quality level across industries at time t and let
xN(t) ≡ Q(t)/LN(t) denote average quality relative to the size of the North. We solve for a
13steady-state equilibrium where xN is constant over time. As product quality improves over time
and Q(t) increases, innovating becomes more difﬁcult. On the other hand, as the North increases
in size over time and LN(t) increases, there are more resources that can be devoted to innovating.
Thus xN is a natural measure of “relative R&D difﬁculty”: R&D difﬁculty relative to the size of the
Northern economy.9
We are now ready to state an innovative R&D condition that must be satisﬁed if Northern ﬁrms












ρ + I + C
= γxN ¯ LN. (18)
Equation (18) has a natural economic interpretation. The left-hand side is related to the beneﬁt
(expected discounted proﬁts) from innovating and the right-hand side is related to the cost of inno-
vating. The beneﬁt from innovating increases when cN or cS increase ( individual consumers buy
more), when ¯ LN or ¯ LS increase (there are more consumers to sell to), when ρ decreases (future
proﬁts are discounted less), and when I or C decrease (the Northern quality leader is less threat-
ened by further innovation or imitation). The cost of innovating increases when xN ¯ LN increases
(innovative R&D becomes relatively more difﬁcult).
Likewise, we can state an imitative R&D condition that must be satisﬁed if Southern ﬁrms are













= βxN ¯ LN. (19)
Equation (19) also has a natural economic interpretation. The left-hand side is related to the beneﬁt
(expected discounted proﬁts) from imitating and the right-hand side is related to the cost of imi-
tating. The beneﬁt from imitating increases when cN or cS increases (individual consumers buy
more), when ¯ LN or ¯ LS increase (there are more consumers to sell to), when ρ decreases (future
proﬁts are discounted less), and when I decrease (the Southern quality leader is less threatened by
further innovation). The cost of imitating increases when xN ¯ LN increases (imitative R&D becomes
relatively more difﬁcult).
9In Segerstrom (1998) and Li (2003), it is shown in a closed-economy setting that, regardless of initial conditions,
relative R&D difﬁculty necessarily converges to a constant value over time. Steger (2003) calibrates the Segerstrom
(1998) model and studies the speed of convergence to the steady-state. In this paper, we focus on the steady-state
properties of the model and do not try to characterize the transition path leading to the steady-state.
142.7 Quality Dynamics








where λ = δσ−1 > 1. We can calculate how Q(t) evolves over time in a steady-state equilibrium.
Since j(θ,t) jumps up to j(θ,t)+1when innovation occurs in industry θ,a n dt h ei nnovation rate







Id θ=( λ − 1)IQ(t).
The growth rate of average product quality
˙ Q
Q is proportional to the innovation rate I in each indus-
try. It follows that the measure of relative R&D difﬁculty xN = Q(t)/LN(t) can only be constant
over time if
˙ Q





Thus, the steady-state innovation rate depends only on the population growth rate n and the R&D
difﬁculty parameter λ,a si nS egerstrom (1998). In a steady-state equilibrium, individual researchers
are becoming less productive and ﬁrms compensate for this by increasing the number of employed
researchers over time. This compensation is only feasible for ﬁrms in general if there is positive
population growth, so positive population growth is needed to sustain technological change in the
long run.











where QN denotes the aggregate quality of Northern products and QS denotes the aggregate qual-
ity of Southern products. We can calculate how QN and QS evolve over time in a steady-state







λj(θ,t)Id θ= CQN − IQS














= IλQS − CQN +( λ − 1)IQN.


















QN ,w h ich simpliﬁes to
QS
QN = C












mS . The average quality of products produced in
the North
QN(t)
mN is somewhat higher than the average quality of products produced in the South
QS(t)
mS since shifts in production from the South to the North are always associated with increases in
product quality (innovation).
2.8 Labor Markets
We assume that workers can move freely and instantaneously across ﬁrms and activities in each
region. Consequently, at each instant in time full employment of labor prevails in each region and
wages adjust instantaneously to equalize labor demand and supply.
Full employment of labor in the North holds at time t when the supply of labor LN(t) equals
the demand for labor in manufacturing plus the demand for labor in R&D. In industry θ with a
Northern industry leader, manufacturing employment is dN(θ,t)LN(t)+τd∗
N(θ,t)LS(t). Thus, the




Likewise, Northern R&D employment in industry θ is
 
i  i = γIq(θ,t) and total Northern R&D
employment is
  1


















activities, respectively. The Northern production employment share increases when cN ¯ LN or cS ¯ LS
increase (aggregate consumerexpenditure ishigherinthe NorthorSouth), orλI/(λI+C)increases
(more products are produced in the North). The Northern R&D employment share increases when
I increases (there is a higher innovation rate) or xN ¯ LN increases (innovating becomes relatively
more difﬁcult).
Similar calculations apply for the Southern labor market. Full employment of labor in the South
holdsat timetwhenthesupplyoflaborLS(t)equalsthe demandforlaborinmanufacturingplusthe
16demand for labor in R&D. In industry θ with a Southern industry leader, manufacturing employment
is dS(θ,t)LS(t)+τd∗




S(θ,t)LN(t)]dθ.L ikewise, Southern R&D employment in industry θ
is
 
i  i = βCq(θ,t) and total Southern R&D employment is
 
mN βCq(θ,t)dθ = βCQN(t).





















The two terms on the right-hand-side of (23) are the shares of Southern labor in production and
R&D activities, respectively. The Southern production employment share increases when cN ¯ LN or
cS ¯ LS increase (aggregate consumer expenditure is higher in the North or South), or C/(λI + C)
increases (there are more products produced in the South). The Southern R&D employment share
increases when C increases (there is a higher rate of copying), λI/(λI + C) increases (there are
more Northern products to copy) or xN ¯ LN increases (imitating becomes relatively more difﬁcult).
The full employment conditions can be greatly simpliﬁed by incorporating information about










.S ubstituting this into (22) yields
1=γxN
 






which we will call the Northern steady-state condition.I ti saNorthern full employment condition
that takes into account the implications of proﬁt-maximizing R&D behavior by Northern ﬁrms.























which we will call the Southern steady-state condition.I ti saSouthern full employment condition
that takes into account the implications of proﬁt-maximizing R&D behavior by Southern ﬁrms.
The Northern and Southern steady-state conditions are illustrated in Figure 2 and are labeled
“North”and“South,” respectively. TheNorthernsteady-stateconditionisupward-slopingin(xN,C)
space with a positive xN intercept, while the Southern steady-state condition is downward-sloping
in (xN,C) space with no intercepts.10 These two curves have a unique intersection at point A and
thus the steady-state equilibrium values of xN and C are uniquely determined.
10To determine the slope of the Northern steady-state condition, we use the result that I =
n


























Figure 2: The steady-state equilibrium
In Figure 2, the vertical axis measures the rate of technology transfer from the North to the
South since any increase in the rate of copying C is associated with faster technology transfer. For
the horizontal axis, it is useful to think of it as measuring the rate of technological change in the
North although this is not exactly true. Movements to the right on the horizontal axis are associated
with temporary increases in the Northern innovation rate I and permanent increases in the relative
size of the Northern R&D sector.
Why is the Northern steady-state condition upward-sloping? The intuition behind this upward-
slope is rather involved but important for understanding the model: When the rate of copying C
increases, there are two steady-state effects in the North. First, a faster rate of copying means that
more industries move to the South and this contributes to reducing production employment in the
North (mN = I
I+C decreases). Second, when Northern industry leaders are exposed to a faster rate
of copying, they must earn higher proﬁt ﬂows while in business for Northern ﬁrms to break even on
their R&D investments [in (18), an increase in C must be matched by a corresponding increase in
cN and/or cS, holding all other variables ﬁxed]. Northern industry leaders earn higher proﬁt ﬂows
when consumers buy more of their products and these higher sales are associated with increased
production employment in individual Northern industries. Given our assumption that ρ>n(the
real interest rate is higher that the population growth rate), the ﬁrst effect unambiguously dominates,
18so aggregate Northern production employment falls when the rate of copying goes up. To maintain
full employment of Northern labor, the fall in Northern production employment must be matched
by a correspond increase in Northern R&D employment. This implies that xN must increase (R&D
becomes relatively more difﬁcult) since only then are more workers needed in the Northern R&D
sector to maintain the steady-state innovation rate I = n
λ−1.T hus, to satisfy both Northern proﬁt-
maximization and full employment conditions, any increase in the rate of copying C (which reduces
Northern production employment) must be matched by an increase in relative R&D difﬁculty xN
(which raises Northern R&D employment).
The intuition behind the downward slope of the Southern steady-state condition is also rather in-
volved: When the rate of copying C decreases, there are two steady-state effects in the South. First,
as l o w e rr ate of copying C means that more industries move to the North and this contributes to low-
ering production employment in the South (mS = C
I+C decreases). Second, a slower rate of copying
C directly contributes to lowering R&D employment in the South (mNC = IC
I+C decreases). Of
course, both Southern production and R&D employment cannot simultaneously decrease because
there is a given supply of labor in the South at any point in time. To maintain full employment
of Southern labor, a decrease in the rate of copying C must be matched by an increase in relative
R&D difﬁculty xN so more Southern R&D labor is needed to maintain any given imitation rate.
From (19), we can also see that an increase in xN is associated with an increase in cN and/or cS
(holding all other variables ﬁxed) and hence, with an increase in Southern production employment.
When R&D is relatively more difﬁcult, Southern industry leaders must earn higher proﬁt ﬂows
while in business to break even on their R&D investments. Thus, to satisfy both Southern proﬁt-
maximization and full employment conditions, any decrease in the rate of copyingC (which reduces
both Southern production and R&D employment) must be matched by an increase in relative R&D
difﬁculty xN (which raises both Southern production and R&D employment).
2.9 The Market Value of Firms
Let VN denote the total market value of all Northern ﬁrms at time t =0and let VS denote the total
market value of all Southern ﬁrms at time t =0 .T os olve the model, we need to determine what
these market values are in steady-state equilibrium.










19Thus the Northern price index PN(t) increases over time with product quality Q(t) and PN(t)/Q(t)





λI+CQ(t) increases over time with product quality Q(t) and PS(t)/Q(t) is constant over
time.
Next consider the proﬁt ﬂows earned by a typical Northern ﬁrm. During the lifetime of the ﬁrm,
q(θ,t) is constant, pN = σwN
σ−1 is constant since wN is constant, PN(t)/Q(t) and PS(t)/Q(t) are
constants, and
˙ Q(t)
Q(t) =( λ − 1)I = n,s oPN(t)/LN(t) and PS(t)/LS(t) are also constants over
time. Thus, it immediately follows from (9) that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow πN(θ,t) is constant over time.
Consequently, the market value of a Northern ﬁrm
πN(θ,t)




lifetime of a Northern ﬁrm. Using this information, VN =
 
mN wNγq(θ,0)dθ = wNγQN(0).





xN ¯ LN. (26)





xN ¯ LN. (27)
Other things being equal, the market value of ﬁrms in a region is higher when workers earn higher
wages and when innovating is relatively more difﬁcult. This is because proﬁt ﬂows are proportional
to wages and increasing in product quality [see (9) and (10)].
2.10 Consumer Expenditures
Having determined the market value of ﬁrms, we are in a position to solve for consumer expendi-
tures. Let AN(t) denote the ﬁnancial assets of the representative Northern consumer. The intertem-
poral budget constraint of the representative Northern consumer ˙ AN(t)=wN + ρAN(t) − cN −
nAN(t) can be rewritten as
˙ AN(t)
AN(t) = wN−cN
AN(t) + ρ − n.S i n ce the growth rate of AN(t) must be
constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium, the intertemporal budget constraint implies that
AN(t) must be constant over time and
cN = wN +( ρ − n)AN. (28)
The representative Northern consumer’s expenditure cN is wage income wN plus interest income
on ﬁnancial assets (ρ − n)AN,a ppropriately adjusted to take into account the splitting of ﬁnancial
20assetsthatresultsfrompopulationgrowth. Usingsimilarreasoning, weobtainthattherepresentative
Southern consumer’s expenditure is
cS = wS +( ρ − n)AS, (29)
where AS is the ﬁnancial assets of the representative Southern consumer.
To pin down exactly what consumer expenditures are, we need to specify who owns the ﬁrms.
Fors implicity, we assume that Northern consumers own the Northern ﬁrms and Southern consumers
own the Southern ﬁrms, that is, AN = VN/¯ LN and AS = VS/¯ LS.T h i sa s s umption is consistent
with the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) ﬁnding that domestic savings ﬁnance domestic ﬁrms. Then,
taking into account (26) and (27), (28) and (29) determine cN and cS.O fm ore interest for solving
the model, the ratio of Northern to Southern consumer expenditure φN ≡ (cN ¯ LN)/(cS ¯ LS) is
φN = w
  ¯ LN +( ρ − n)γ λI
λI+CxN ¯ LN




Note that φN is a well-deﬁned function of the relative wage w ≡ wN
wS only, since everything else in
the bracketed expression is determined in steady-state equilibrium.
2.11 The relative Wage
To determine the steady-state equilibrium value of the relative wage w,w ed ivide the imitative R&D




















γ(ρ + I + C)
.
Substituting for pN, pS, PN(t) and PS(t) yields the steady-state wage equation
(τσ−1 + φNτ1−τ)λI












w does not depend on w and is completely pinned down by previous steady-state equilibrium
calculations, the denominator on the LHS of the wage equation (31) is decreasing in w and the
numerator is increasing in w.H ence, the LHS of the wage equation is increasing in w.F urthermore,
the LHS converges to zero as w converges to zero and the LHS converges to inﬁnity as w converges
to inﬁnity. Thus, the wage equation (31) uniquely determines w.
21The model’s steady-state equilibrium is uniquely determined by the Northern condition (24), the
Southern condition (25) and the wage condition (31). These equations uniqely determine steady-
stateequilibriumvaluesofxN, C andw.O fcourse, toverifythatwereallyhavefoundasteady-state
equilibrium, we always need to check that w lies in the wage interval τ<w<δ
τ.
2.12 Steady-State Utility Paths
We turn now to solving for the steady-state utility paths of representative consumers in the North
and South, respectively.











Substituting using (5) and (6) yields uN(t)=cNPN(t)1/(σ−1).F urther substituting for steady-state
cN and PN(t),w eobtain an expression for steady-state utility of the typical Northern consumer:
uN(t)=
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σ−1
.
Following the same procedure for the typical Southern consumer yields
uS(t)=
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σ−1
.
In both the North and the South, consumer utility grows over time entirely because of growth
in the quality Q(t) of products. Furthermore, because xN =
Q(t)
LN(t) is constant in steady-state



















LN(t) constant also implies that Q(0) = xN ¯ LN, from which it follows that the steady-state
utility of the typical Northern consumer at time t =0is
uN(0) =
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σ−1
(33)
and the steady-state utility of the typical Southern consumer at time t =0is
uS(0) =
 





















22Equations (33) and (34) will prove useful for studying the long-run welfare effects of policy
changes. Taking as given that the economy always converges over time to its steady-state equi-
librium, whenever there is a change in the economic environment (for example, trade costs fall),
this leads to convergence to a new steady-state equilibrium. Since the old and the new steady-state
equilibrium paths involve the same rate of economic growth, we just have to compare utility levels
at time t =0in the old and new steady-states to determine whether the change makes consumers
better off in the long run. If uN(0) is higher in the steady-state equilibrium with lower trade costs,
this means that eventually the typical Northern consumer will be happier on the new equilibrium
path with lower trade costs than on the old equilibrium path with higher trade costs.
This completes the description of the model’s steady-state equilibrium.
3S teady-State Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we study the steady-state equilibrium properties of the model. To illustrate the
model’s potential, we study the implications of three aspects of “globalization”: increases in the
size of the South (i.e., countries like China joining the world trading system), stronger intellectual
property protection (i.e., the TRIPs agreement that was part of the Uruguay Round) and lower trade
costs (i.e., improvements in transportation technology or reductions in trade barriers). An increase
in the size of the South is capturing by increasing ¯ LS,t h es ize of the South at time t =0 .11 Stronger
intellectual property protection is captured by increasing β,t he parameter that governs how hard
it is for Southern ﬁrms to copy ideas developed in the North.12 Lower trade costs are captured by
decreasing τ.
3.1 General Results
First, an increase in the size of the South ¯ LS has no effect on the Northern steady-state condition
(24) but implies that xN increases for given C in (25). Thus the Southern steady-state condition
shifts to the right in (xN,C) space and this is illustrated in Figure 3. Starting from the steady-
11An increase in the relative size of the South ¯ LS can also be thought of as capturing the effects of a higher population
growth rate in the South. In the model, we have assumed a common population growth rate in both regions and this
assumption is necessary to obtain a steady-state equilibrium. However, in the real world, Southern population growth has
clearly exceeded Northern population growth in recent decades.
12This is how stronger intellectual property rights are modelled in Glass and Saggi (2002).








Figure 3: The Steady-State Effects of Increasing the Size of the South
state equilibrium given by point A,a ni n c rease in ¯ LS leads to a new steady-state equilibrium given




Q(t) temporarily grows at a faster than usual rate. This means that a permanent increase in xN is
associated with a temporary increase in the Northern innovation rate I.
Second, an increase in β has no effect on the Northern steady-state condition (24) but implies
that xN decreases for given C in (25). Thus the Southern steady-state condition shifts to the left in
(xN,C) space and this is illustrated in Figure 4. Starting from the steady-state equilibrium given by
point A,a ni n c r e ase in β leads to a new steady-state equilibrium given by point B.T hus stronger
intellectual property protection leads to a decrease in both xN and C.
Finally, a decrease in τ has no effect on the Northern steady-state condition (24) and no effect
on the Southern steady-state condition (25). Thus, decreasing τ has no effect on either xN or C.
We have established
Theorem 1 (i) A permanent increase in the size of the South (¯ LS ↑) leads to a permanent increase in
the rate of copying of Northern products (C ↑) and a temporary increase in the Northern innovation
rate (xN ↑). (ii) A permanent increase in intellectual property protection (β ↑) leads to a permanent







Figure 4: The Steady-State Effects of Stronger Intellectual Property Protection
decreaseintherateofcopyingofNorthernproducts(C ↓)andatemporarydecreaseintheNorthern
innovation rate (xN ↓). (iii) A permanent decrease in trade costs (τ ↓) leads to no change in the
rate of copying of Northern products (C constant) and no change in the Northern innovation rate
(xN constant).
Interestingly, all three aspects of globalization have different steady-state equilibrium effects.
We discuss now the intuition underlying these effects.
An increase in the size of the South naturally leads to more copying of Northern products and
this faster rate of technology transfer means that production (and jobs) move from the high wage
North to the low wage South. With production jobs moving to the South, more Northern workers
become available for employment in the Northern R&D sector and the Northern wage must adjust to
make it attractive for Northern ﬁrms to expand their R&D activities. In the short-run, an increase in
the size of the South causes the industry-level innovation rate I to jump up and technological change
to accelerate, but the industry-level innovation rate gradually falls back to the original steady-state
level I = n/(λ − 1) as R&D becomes relatively more difﬁcult. In the long run, an increase in the
size of the South does not change the innovation rate but increases relative R&D difﬁculty xN and
the fraction of Northern labor employed in R&D activities.
25Ai ncrease in intellectual property protection naturally leads to less copying of Northern prod-
ucts. What is perhaps surprising is that it also slows technological change. In economic mod-
els, stronger patent enforcement often promotes innovative activity. For example, Horowitz and
Lai (1996) show in a closed economy setting that increasing the patent length raises the rate-of-
innovation except when the patent length exceeds the welfare-maximizing patent length. But in this
North-South trade setting, the lower rate of copying that stronger intellectual property protection
generates has important implications for the Northern labor market. The slower rate of technology
transfer from the North to the South directly increases the demand for Northern production workers
(because fewer production jobs get transferred to the South). However, since Northern workers were
fully employed to begin with, there are no additional Northern workers to hire (at any given point
in time). Thus, the Northern wage must increase enough so that the increase in demand for North-
ern production workers is completely offset by a decrease in demand for Northern R&D workers.
In negotiations about the protection of intellectual property rights at the World Trade Organization
(WTO), developing countries have been arguing that stronger intellectual property rights protec-
tion would simply generate substantial rents for Northern innovators at the expense of Southern
consumers and would not stimulate faster technological change (see Maskus, 2000). Theorem 1
provides support for this position taken by developing countries.
The result in Theorem 1 that is perhaps the most surprising is that lower trade costs between
the North and the South have no effect on the rate of technology transfer or rate of innovation. The
reason is that when trade costs fall, Northern ﬁrms make higher proﬁts from exporting to the South
butt heir proﬁts fall from selling their products locally in the North because the Northern market
becomes more competitive. Given the assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz consumer preferences, these two
opposing effects exactly cancel. Thus lower trade costs do not change either the proﬁts earned from
innovating or the proﬁts earned from imitating. Consequently, there is no change in either C or xN.
Baldwin and Forslid (2000) obtain the same type of result in the context of North-North trade.
While it is straightforward to obtain general results about how different aspects of globalization
affect C and xN,t he same is not true for what happens to the relative wage w and consumer welfare.
The reason is that the wage condition (31) is quite complicated. One way to proceed is to study
the remaining properties of the model using computer simulations and this is certainly feasible.
However, in the interest of obtaining more analytical results, we focus in the rest of the paper on a
special case, namely, when there is costless trade (τ =1 ). To obtain further analytical results about
the effects of lowering trade costs, we focus on the marginal effects of moving towards costless
26trade.
3.2 The Costless Trade Special Case
When there is costless trade between the North and the South (τ =1 ), the wage interval that must
be satisﬁed becomes 1 <w<δ . Furthermore, the wage condition (31) simpliﬁes considerably to
wσ =
β(ρ + I)
γ(ρ + I + C)
. (35)
Since the innovation rate is given by I = n
λ−1,t his wage equation implies that the relative wage w is
ad ecreasing function of the rate of copying C.O t h e rthings being equal, when the rate of copying
increases, this decreases the reward for innovating relative to the reward for imitating and results in
af all in the relative wage of Northern workers.
We will ﬁrst establish conditions under which the model has a steady-state equilibrium when
there is costless trade, that is, when the wage interval 1 <w<δis satisﬁed.
As we have already shown in Theorem 1, steady-state C is an increasing function of ¯ LS, holding
all other parameters ﬁxed. Let C = f(¯ LS) denote this increasing function. If ¯ LS =0 ,t hen (24)
and (25) imply that only C =0satisﬁes both conditions, so 0=f(0).
From the wage equation (35), since C is an increasing function of ¯ LS, w is a decreasing function
of ¯ LS.I tf o llows that w<δis satisﬁed for all ¯ LS > 0 if w ≤ δ when ¯ LS =0 .H owever, (35)
implies that w =( β/γ)1/σ when ¯ LS =0and C =0 .T hus w =( β/γ)1/σ ≤ δ holds when ¯ LS =0
if and only if β ≤ γδσ.W ew ill assume that this inequality holds.
Since w is a decreasing function of ¯ LS, 1 <wis satisﬁed if ¯ LS is not too large. Solving (35)
for w, 1 <wis satisﬁed if and only if C = f(¯ LS) < ¯ C where ¯ C ≡ (ρ + I)(
β
γ − 1).A lternatively
stated, 1 <wis satisﬁed ifa n donly if ¯ LS <f −1( ¯ C).W ea s s u m et h a tγ<βholds to guarantee
that ¯ C>0 and f−1( ¯ C) > 0.
We have established
Theorem2Giventhatβ ∈ (γ,γδσ]andτ =1hold, themodelhasauniquesteadystateequilibrium
if ¯ LS <f −1( ¯ C).
Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium under costless trade if
the initial size of the South ¯ LS is not too large. When the South becomes sufﬁciently large relative
to the North (¯ LS ≥ f−1( ¯ C)), then factor price equalization results (w =1 )a nd the model ceases to
be a model of North-South trade.
27Consider next the steady-state equilibrium effects of different aspects of globalization on the
relative wage w.S i n ce an increase in ¯ LS increases C, (35) implies that w falls. In constrast, since
an increase in β decreases C, (35) implies that w rises. We have established
Theorem 3 When there is costless trade, a permanent increase in the size of the South (¯ LS ↑) leads
to a permanent decrease in the Northern relative wage (w ≡ wN
wS ↓), while a permanent increase in
intellectual property protection (β ↑) leads to a permanent increase in the Northern relative wage
(w ≡ wN
wS ↑).
The intuition behind these steady-state effects is quite intuitive. An increase in the size of the
South ¯ LS leads to a faster rate of copying C of Northern products by Southern ﬁrms. Consequently,
with more production jobs moving from the high-wage North to the low-wage South, to restore full
employment of labor in the North, the Northern relative wage w must fall enough so that the loss
of Northern production employment is fully offset by an increase in Northern R&D employment.
Fors tronger intellectual property protection, we just run this intuition in the opposite direction. An
increase in the intellectual property protection β leads to a slower rate of copying C of Northern
products by Southern ﬁrms. Consequently, fewer production jobs move from the high-wage North
to the low-wage South, increasing the demand for Northern labor. The Northern relative wage w
must rise enough so that the gain in Northern production employment is fully offset by a loss in
Northern R&D employment.
Solving for the steady-state equilibrium effect of lower trade costs τ on the Northern relative
wage w involves more work. Since a change in τ has no effect on I, C and xN,t h eL H So ft h ewage
equation (31) can be viewed as a function of just τ and w.L e tg(τ,w) denote this function. We
proceed by totally differentiating the wage equation (31) with respect to w and τ and then using the











































(σ − 1)(φN − 1)w
σ(1 + φN)
. (36)
Increasing trade costs τ on the margin starting from costless trade increases the relative wage
w if φN > 1 and decreases the relative wage w if φN < 1.T he condition φN > 1 means that
28aggregate Northern consumer expenditure is larger that aggregate Southern consumer expenditure
(¯ LNcN > ¯ LScS), or the Northern market is larger than the Southern market (in terms of purchasing
power).
We are mainly interesting in the result going in the reverse direction, which can be stated as:
Theorem 4 In the neighborhood of costless trade, a permanent decrease in the trade costs (τ ↓)
leads to a permanent decrease in the Northern relative wage (w ≡ wN
wS ↓)i ft h eNorthern market
is larger than the Southern market (φN > 1), and has the opposite effect on the Northern relative
wage (w ≡ wN
wS ↑)i ft he Northern market is smaller than the Southern market (φN < 1).
When trade costs τ decrease on the margin, there is no effect on the innovation rate I,t h e
copying rate C or relative R&D difﬁculty xN.R eferring back to (24) and (25), the relative size of
the Northern R&D sector γxNI does not change and the relative size of the Southern R&D sector
β xN ¯ LN
¯ LS C λI
λI+C does not change either. But the reduction in trade costs does lead to a reallocation
of resources in both the North and the South. Firms respond by exporting more, employing more
workers to produce goods for the export market and employ fewer workers to produce goods for
the domestic market. Lower trade costs mean that ﬁrms face stiffer competition in their domestic
markets since the prices charged by other ﬁrms fall. For ﬁrms in the larger market, this stiffer
domestic competition is more important in lowering labor demand than the increase in exporting is
in raising labor demand. Thus lower trade costs tend to depress the relative wage of workers in the
larger market.
In the real world, the North is clearly larger than the South when it comes to aggregate income
and purchasing power. Thus we interpret Theorem 4 as implying that lower trade costs permanently
reduce the Northern relative wage w.A ni ncrease in the size of the South also lowers the relative
wage, while an increase in intellectual property protection raises the relative wage. Thus, two of the
three aspects of globalization that we have studied in this paper lower the relative wage of Northern
workers.
Has wage inequality in fact decreased between Northern and South workers during the past
several decades of globalization? There is a growing empirical literature that looks at how income
inequality has been changing over time for the world as a whole and the results depend critically
on how income inequality is measured. For example, if income inequality is measured by GDP
per capita across countries, then global income inequality has increased considerably since 1980.
Pritchett (1997) reports that during the period 1980-1994, the mean per annum growth rate of GDP
29per capita was 1.5% for 17 advanced capitalist countries and only 0.34% for 28 less developed
countries. Butthiswayofmeasuringincomeinequalityhasbeencriticizedbecauseittakescountries
as its unit of analysis rather than people, so the 1.3 billion citizens of China count for no more than
do the 0.0004 billion citizens of Luxembourg. Jones (1997) shows that global income inequality has
in fact decreased if each country’s average income is weighted by its population, mainly because
of the good growth performance of the world’s two largest countries China and India. And when
within-country income inequality is also taken into account, Sala-i-Martin (2002) still ﬁnds that
global inequality has decreased substantially since 1980.
Another piece of evidence is provided by Wacziarg and Welch (2002). They ask the question, do
countries tend to experience faster or slower economic growth rates following trade liberalization?
Wacziarg and Welch ﬁnd that trade-centered reform (countries switching from being “closed” to
being “open” using the Sachs-Warner (1995) criterion) has on average robust positive effects on
economic growth rates within countries. For the typical country that switches from being closed to
being open, the growth rate of real per capita GDP increases by 1.4% (see Table 13 in Wacziarg
and Welch (2002) and the regression with both country and year ﬁxed effects). This estimate is
both highly statistically signiﬁcant and economically signiﬁcant. It means that for a typical country
growing at an average annual rate of 1.1% before trade liberalization, its average annual growth rate
jumps up to 1.1%+1.4%=2.5% after trade liberalization. Since it is exclusively developing countries
that have become “open” in the last three decades and these countries tend to grow faster as a result,
the ﬁndings in Wacziarg and Welch (2002) are consistent with a declining wage gap between the
North and the South.13
Some other models of North-South trade and economic growth have recently been developed
that do not have the counterfactual growth implications mentioned in the introduction. Building
on an earlier version of this paper, Gustafsson (2004) has developed a North-South trade model
where innovations increase product variety (instead of product quality) and scale effects are ruled
out by using the same R&D technology as in Jones (1995b). Sener (2006) has developed a North-
South trade model where scale effects are removed by assuming that successful innovators engage
in rent protection activities to deter the innovation and imitation efforts of their rivals, building
on the closed economy model by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2006). Also of interest, Parello
(2004) has developed a North-South trade model where scale effects are removed by assuming
13The empirical literature of trade and growth using cross sectional data has been heavily criticized in an inﬂuential
paper by Rodriguez and Rodrick (2000). However, Wacziarg and Welch (2002) use panel data and look at the within-
country growth effects of trade liberalization, something that had not been done in the earlier literature.
30that R&D difﬁculty increases over time based either on cumulative R&D effort [as in Segerstrom
(1998)] or on the size of the market [as in Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999)]. None of these papers
look at the welfare implications of changes in the economic environment or study the effects of
lower trade costs. Gustafsson (2004) shows that the results derived in this paper about the effects
of a larger South and stronger intellectual property rights also hold when innovations are variety-
increasing. In contrast, Sener (2006) ﬁnds that a larger South increases North-South wage inequality
and stronger intellectual property protection permanently decreases the innovation rate. Parello
(2004) just studies the effects of stronger intellectual property protection and ﬁnds that this increases
the innovation rate if and only if the Northern human capital stock is relatively low.
In this paper and all of the above-mentioned papers, all technology transfer takes the form of
Southern ﬁrms copying Northern products. We have also written a companion paper, Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2005), which studies the polar opposite case where all technology transfer is done
by the Northern ﬁrms themselves. Northern ﬁrms engage in adaptive R&D to learn how to produce
their products in the lower-wage South. In the environment with foreign direct investment and
multinational ﬁrms, most of the results derived in the present paper continue to hold but there are
some differences. In particular, an increase in the size of the South no longer has the steady-state
effect of decreasing the Northern relative wage when all technology transfer is done by the Northern
ﬁrms themselves.
4W e l fare Implications
In this section, we study the welfare implications of the model. We continue to study the impli-
cations of three aspects of globalization: increases in the size of the South, stronger intellectual
property protection and lower trade costs.
Consider ﬁrst the welfare implications of lower trade costs. A change in τ has no steady-state
effect on I, C or xN.H ence, an immediate jump to the new steady-state equilibrium is feasible and
the long run welfare effects of a change in τ are also the short run welfare effects. Equation (33)
implies that a change in τ only beneﬁts the typical Northern consumer if it leads to an increase in
w
τ . Likewise, (34) implies that a change in τ only beneﬁts the typical Southern consumer if it leads






















(σ − 1)(φN − 1)w
σ(1 + φN)
+ w>0,
taking into account that φN > 0. Thus, regardless of the value of φN,a ni n c rease in trade costs
τ makes the typical Northern consumer worse off and makes the typical Southern consumer worse
off. We are mainly interesting in the result going in the reverse direction, which can be stated as:
Theorem 5 In the neighborhood of costless trade, a permanent decrease in the trade costs (τ ↓)
makesthetypicalNorthernconsumerbetteroff(uN(0) ↑), andmakesthetypicalSouthernconsumer
better off (uS(0) ↑).
Theorem5issurprisinginlightoftheambiguouseffectoflowertradecostsontherelativewage.
Eventhoughlowertradecostsτ caneitherincreaseordecreasetherelativewagew dependingonthe
value of φN (Theorem 4), the proof of Theorem 5 shows that this wage effect is always dominated
by the effect on prices. Lower trade costs lead to lower prices for goods in both the North and the
South. Consumers beneﬁt from lower prices and these price beneﬁts always dominate the possibly
negative effects of lower trade costs on their wages.
Consider next the welfare implications of an increase in the size of the South ¯ LS when there is
costless trade. Things are more complicated now because an increase in the size of the South ¯ LS
has the steady-state effects of increasing C and xN,a sw ell as decreasing w.I nw h a tfollows, we
set wS =1and treat the Southern wage as the numeraire.
Focusing ﬁrst on the North and using uN(t)=cNPN(t)1/(σ−1),i tp r oves to bec o n v e n i e n tt o
rewrite (33) as uN(0) = cNPN(0)1/(σ−1) where the typical consumer’s expenditure is
cN = wN
 






















From the Northern condition (24), since an increase in ¯ LS raises both C and xN, xN
λI+C decreases
unambiguously. It follows immediately that an increase in ¯ LS lowers consumer expenditure cN
because both the consumer’s wage income wN and interest income wN(ρ − n)γ λI
λI+CxN fall. It
also follows immediately that an increase in ¯ LS raises the Northern price index PN(0) because
32both the average quality of products increase (xN ↑)a n dt h ea v e rage price level becomes more




λI+C ↑). The overall effect on Northern consumer welfare
is ambiguous.
Focusing next on the South, we can use the same general procedure for determining the welfare
effects. Using uS(t)=cSPS(t)1/(σ−1),i tp roves to be convenient to rewrite (34) as uS(0) =
cSPS(0)1/(σ−1) where the typical consumer’s expenditure is





and the Southern price index PS(0) is the same as the Northern price index PN(0) since costless




It follows immediately that an increase in ¯ LS has no effect on consumer expenditure cS but it does
raise the Southern price index PS(0) for the same reasons as in the North. The overall effect on
Southern consumer welfare is unambiguously positive. To summarize, we have established
Theorem 6 When there is costless trade, a permanent increase in the size of the South (¯ LS ↑) has
an ambiguous effect on the long run welfare of the typical Northern consumer but unambiguously
makes the typical Southern consumer better off in the long run (uS(0) ↑).
An increase in the size of the South ¯ LS results in a faster steady-state rate of copying C of
Northern products. This stimulates technological change in the North but also depresses the wages
of Northern workers. The overall effect on Northern welfare in the long run is ambiguous. On the
one hand, Northern consumers are hurt by the fall in their wage and interest income but on the other
hand, they beneﬁt from being able to buy higher quality products at lower prices. For Southern
consumers, the long-run welfare effects of an increase in the size of the South are unambiguously
positive. Southern consumers are able to buy higher quality products at lower prices and there is no
change in their wage or interest income.
Consider ﬁnally the welfare implications of an increase in intellectual property protection β
when there is costless trade. Things are complicated in this case as well because an increase in β
has the steady-state effects of decreasing C and xN,a sw ell as increasing w.W e s e t wS =1as
before.
From the Northern condition (24), since an increase in β lowers both C and xN, xN
λI+C increases
unambiguously. It follows immediately that an increase in β raises Northern consumer expenditure
cN because both the consumer’s wage income wN and interest income wN(ρ − n)γ λI
λI+CxN rise.
33It also follows immediately that an increase in β lowers the Northern price index PN(0) because
both the average quality of products decrease (xN ↓)a n dt h ea v e rage price level becomes less




λI+C ↓). The overall effect on Northern consumer welfare
is ambiguous.
From the Southern condition (25), an increase in β has no effect on β C
λI+C
xN ¯ LN
¯ LS . It follows
immediately that an increase in β has no effect on Southern consumer expenditure cS but it does
lower the Southern price index PS(0) for the same reasons as in the North. The overall effect on
Southern consumer welfare is unambiguously negative. To summarize, we have established
Theorem 7 When there is costless trade, a permanent increase in intellectual property protection
(β ↑) has an ambiguous effect on the long run welfare of the typical Northern consumer but unam-
biguously makes the typical Southern consumer worse off in the long run (uS(0) ↓).
An increase in intellectual property protection β results in a slower steady-state rate of copying
C of Northern products. This slows technological change in the North but also raises the wages
of Northern workers. The overall effect on Northern welfare in the long run is ambiguous. On the
one hand, Northern consumers beneﬁt from the rise in their wage and interest income but on the
other hand, they are hurt from having to buy lower quality products at higher prices. For Southern
consumers, the long-run welfare effects of an increase in intellectual property protection are unam-
biguously negative. Southern consumers end up buying lower quality products at higher prices and
there is no change in their wage or interest income.
5C o n clusions
This paper develops a dynamic, general-equilibrium model of North-South trade and economic
growth. Both innovation and imitation rates are endogenously determined as well as the degree
of wage inequality between Northern and Southern workers. Northern ﬁrms devote resources to
innovativeR&DtodiscoverhigherqualityproductsandSouthernﬁrmsdevoteresourcestoimitative
R&D to copy state-of-the-art quality Northern products. The model does not have the counterfactual
growth implications of earlier North-South trade models and can be used to study the long-run
welfare implications of changes in the economic environment. We have used the model to study
the equilibrium and welfare implications of three aspects of globalization: increases in the size of
the South (i.e., countries like China joining the world trading system), stronger intellectual property
34protection (i.e., the TRIPs agreement that was part of the Uruguay Round) and lower trade costs.
Because the theoretical framework developed in this paper is quite tractable, it could prove
useful for analyzing other issues. For example, the model only has one factor of production. By
extending the model to allow for two factors of production (low and high-skilled labor), one could
study how different aspects of globalization affect wage inequality within regions. The effects
of Northern and/or Southern tariffs, technology transfer by means of licensing agreements, and
international labor migration could also be studied using this framework. These are all possible
directions for further research.
References
Aghion, P., Harris, C., Howitt, P., and Vickers, J. (2001), “Competetion, Imitation and Growth with
Step-by-Step Innovation,” Review of Economic Studies, 68, 467-492.
Anderson, J., and van Wincoop, E., (2004), “Trade Costs,” Journal of Economic Literature, 42,
691-751.
Baldwin, R., and Forslid, R., (2000), “Trade Liberalization and Endogenous Growth: A q-Theory
Approach,” Journal of International Economics, 50, 497-517.
Chui, M., Levine, P., Murshed, M. and Pearlman, J. (2002), “North-South Models of Growth and
Trade,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 16, 123-165.
Dinopoulos, E. and Segerstrom, P. (2005), “Multinational Firms and Economic Growth,” mimeo,
Stockholm School of Economics.
Dinopoulos, E. and Syropoulos, C. (2006), “Rent Protection as a Barrier to Innovation and Growth,”
Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Dinopoulos, E. and Thompson, P. (1998), “Schumpeterian Growth Without Scale Effects,” Journal
of Economic Growth, 3, 313-335.
Dinopoulos, E. and Thompson, P. (1999), “Scale Effects in Schumpeterian Models of Economic
Growth,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 9, 157-185.
Feldstein, M. and Horioka, C. (1980), “Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows,” Eco-
nomic Journal, 90, 314-329.
Glass, A. and Saggi, K. (2002), “Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment,” Jour-
nal of International Economics, 56, 387-410.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991a), “Quality Ladders and Product Cycles,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 106, 557-586.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991b), “Endogenous Product Cycles,” The Economic Journal,
101, 1214-1229.
Gustafsson, P. (2004), “Scale-invariant Growth in a North-South Model with Horizontal Innova-
tion,” mimeo, Stockholm School of Economics.
Horowitz, A. and Lai, E. (1996), “Patent Length and the Rate of Innovation,” International Eco-
nomic Review, 785-801.
Howitt, P.(1999), “SteadyEndogenousGrowthwithPopulationandR&DInputsGrowing,” Journal
of Political Economy, 107, 715-730.
35Jones, B.(2005), “TheBurdenofKnowledgeandthe‘DeathoftheRenaissanceMan’: IsInnovation
Getting Harder?,” mimeo, Northwestern University.
Jones, C. (1995a), “Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 110, 495-525.
Jones, C. (1995b), “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 103,
759-784.
Jones, C. (1997), “On the Evolution of the World Income Distribution,” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 11, 19-36.
Kortum, S. (1993), “Equilibrium R&D and the Patent-R&D Ratio: U.S. Evidence,” American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 83, 450-457.
Kortum, S. (1997), “Research, Patenting and Technological Change,” Econometrica, 65, 1389-
1419.
Lai, E. (1998), “International Property Rights Protection and the Rate of Product Innovation,” Jour-
nal of Development Economics, 55, 133-153.
Li, C. (2003), “Endogenous Growth Without Scale Effects: A Comment,” American Economic
Review, 93, 1009-1018.
Mansﬁeld, E., Schwartz, M. and Wagner, S. (1981), “Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical
Study,” The Economic Journal, 91, 907-918.
Maskus, K. (2000), Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, Institute for International
Economics, Washington, D.C.
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff, K. (2000), “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is
There a Common Cause?,” in B. Bernanke and K. Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual
2000, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Parello, C. (2004), “Endogenous Imitation and Intellectual Property,” mimeo, University of Rome
“La Sapienza”.
Pritchett, L. (1997), “Divergence Big Time,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 3-17.
Rodriguez, F. and Rodrik, D. (2000), “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptics Guide to the
Cross-National Evidence,” in B. Bernanke and K. Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual
2000, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (1995), “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-118.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (2002), “The Disturbing “Rise” of Global Income Inequality,” mimeo, Columbia
University.
Segerstrom, P., Anant, T. and Dinopoulos, E. (1990), “A Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life
Cycle,” American Economic Review, 80, 1077-1091.
Segerstrom, P. (1998), “Endogenous Growth Without Scale Effects,” American Economic Review,
88, 1290-1310.
Segerstrom, P. (2005), “Intel Economics,” International Economic Review, forthcoming.
Sener, F. (2006), “Intellectual Property Rights and Rent Protection in a North-South Product-Cycle
Model,” mimeo, Union College.
Steger, T. (2003), “The Segerstrom Model: Stability, Speed of Convergence and Policy Implica-
tions,” Economics Bulletin, 15, 1-8.
Wacziarg, R. and Welch, K. (2002), “Trade Liberalization and Economic Growth: New Evidence,”
mimeo, Stanford University.
Yang, G. and Maskus, K. (2001), “Intellectual Property Rights, Licensing and Innovation in an
Endogenous Product-Cycle Model,” Journal of International Economics, 53, 169-187.
Young, A. (1998), “Growth Without Scale Effects,” Journal of Political Economy, 106, 41-63.
36